
Maxime St-Hilaire is a full professor in the Université de Sherbrook Faculty of Law.
Introduction
The conventional narrative holds that human rights and their incorporation into positive law represent the culmination of a juridical “modernity” that, at a foundational level, replaced the “classical” natural law of the common good (grounded in the objective order of a plurality of political communities) with the subjective rights of the universal individual. One may thus be struck by the singularity of Jacques Maritain: a Thomist who nevertheless became one of the principal architects of the mid-twentieth-century “human rights revolution.” John Finnis, however, offers a reading of Thomas Aquinas according to which Aquinas not only delineated limits on state authority, embraced the ideal of liberty under the rule of law, and anticipated Lon Fuller’s desiderata of the rule of law but also foreshadowed the very idea of human rights.
Such a “liberal” reading of the Angelic Doctor is by no means universally accepted. Other thinkers invoke Thomism primarily in their critique of liberal legal thought. For them, the point is not to discover in Thomas Aquinas an anticipation of the idea of human rights so much as his conception of the common good, to which individual rights must be ordered if they are to find their true meaning, value, scope, and consequently, their proper guide to interpretation.
Adrian Vermeule, for instance, relies not only on Aquinas’s famous definition of law as an ordinance of reason for the common good, promulgated by a public authority who has charge of the community, but also on Charles De Koninck’s defense of the idea that “the good of the community is itself the good for the individuals.” Here he cites Ralph McInerny’s English translation of De la primauté du bien commun contre les personnalistes (1943), in which De Koninck made his polemical critique of Maritain explicit and public without mentioning him by name. The dispute between Thomists Maritain and De Koninck concerning the relationship of the human person to the common good thus emerges as a possible philosophical antecedent to the tension that distinguishes the respective engagements of jurists Finnis and Vermeule with Acquinas’s work.
Rather than simplistically and misleadingly opposing, as Leo Strauss did, liberalism and rights to the classical tradition and the obligations imposed by the common good, the Maritain–De Koninck controversy engages the enduring political question of the relationship between citizen and polity in a way that sheds light on the role of rights for pre-liberal thinkers. In this way, the sharp rupture exaggerated by simplifications of Renaissance humanism is tempered, the relative continuity of the tension between individual and social poles is restored, and above all, the richness of resources contained in Aquinas’s work is made available to contemporary political and legal debate.
Yet this controversy between Maritain and De Koninck has frequently been misconstrued. Maritain’s distinction between the person and society has too often been taken to imply a corresponding opposition between the person and the common good. Once Maritain’s position is reconstructed on its own terms, however, it becomes possible to determine more precisely both the target and the limits of De Koninck’s critique and, thereby, to identify what remains the deepest point of disagreement between these two Thomist philosophers.
The Noise in (and Surrounding) the Debate
Whether the disagreement between Maritain and De Koninck was genuine has long been disputed. Ignatius Eschmanndefended Maritain against De Koninck’s criticisms, Yves Simon argued De Koninck had largely attacked positions that were not Maritain’s, and Michael Smith later sought to reconcile the two authors. Indeed, many of De Koninck’s objections are directed against propositions Maritain explicitly rejects, such as claims that the common good is a collection of private goods, that it exists for the private good of the individual, or that the proper good of the person can be separated from the common good. Any assessment of De Koninck’s critique therefore requires that Maritain’s position first be reconstructed on its own terms.
Maritain undoubtedly maintains that the person, unlike the material individual, is ethically prior and therefore superior to society. As an individual, man is wholly engaged in political society as one of its parts; as a person, however, he transcends society because he is immediately and personally ordained to God. Yet this distinction between the individual and the person does not translate into a simple opposition between the person and the common good. Rather, Maritain progressively reformulates the very notion of the common good.
For Maritain, the ultimate end of the human person is God himself, who is possessed through the beatific vision. Because this participation in God is direct and personal, the person, unlike the material individual, is a whole rather than merely a part. Christianity thus reveals that political society is not simply a whole composed of parts but, properly understood, a society of persons—that is, a whole composed of wholes. Contrary to many readings of his work, however, Maritain does not abandon the idea of the common good. Rather, the material or “public” good of the social whole is transformed into a genuine common good through the recognition of the person by means of rights. It is precisely this recognition that redistributes the good of the social whole to persons, thereby allowing the person’s proper good to coincide, albeit imperfectly, with the political common good while remaining ultimately ordered to the uncreated good of God. Because this coincidence can never be complete within temporal society, the recognition of rights remains permanently necessary.
The relationship between the person and society must therefore be distinguished from the relationship between the person and the common good. Maritain does not simply subordinate the individual to society while exempting the person from every common good. Instead, he conceives a hierarchy of common goods culminating in the beatific vision, within which the political common good itself is achieved through the recognition of the person. The real question, therefore, is not whether Maritain subordinates the person to the common good—for he explicitly continues to speak of the common good—but whether the common good he describes remains the common good of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. It is precisely this question that De Koninck addresses.
The Crux of the Debate
De Koninck’s criticism is directed not at the proposition that the common good coincides with the person’s proper good—indeed, he affirms this proposition even more strongly than Maritain—but at Maritain’s conception of the common good itself. For De Koninck, the beatific vision cannot be regarded as merely personal. Although superior to every created common good, it is itself the supreme common good, in relation to which man has more the character of a part than anywhere else and belongs as a citizen of the heavenly city.
From this theological premise follow several further objections. Because the person’s relationship to God is not exclusive or merely personal, freedom and the secrecy of conscience do not escape the created order but remain ordered to the common good. Nor is there any basis for distinguishing the person, as a whole, from the individual, as a part. The spiritual dimension of the human being does not remove her from the hierarchy of created and uncreated common goods. Rather, the individual person is ordered at every level to a hierarchy of common goods, themselves ordered to the absolute good, which is God Himself.
De Koninck then advances what appears to be his principal conceptual objection. Every common good is the good of a whole to which parts are ordered. The idea of the common good of a “whole of wholes” is therefore a contradiction in terms. Consequently, even if Maritain were correct in treating the person as a whole rather than a part, neither the person nor her proper good could constitute a common good.
To support this conception, De Koninck appeals to the Aristotelian-Thomistic notions of participation and diffusion. Participation explains how the common good is not the aggregate of singular goods but the good of an ethically prior order in which many persons may simultaneously participate without dividing or exhausting it. Diffusion explains its superiority: because the good naturally communicates itself, the common good, unlike singular goods such as health or wealth, perfects a plurality of persons at once. From this perspective, the suggestion that each person could herself be a common good for all the others is incoherent. Since the common good belongs to a single order, a singular person cannot constitute it. A singular person (or her good) therefore cannot be a good that is participable and diffusive in the defining manner of the common good. Nor could the good (or goods) of a mere juxtaposition of persons, all of whom are ethically posterior to the social order, constitute their common good; at most, they could form a “sordid fraternity.”
Yet these arguments remain within the analytical unfolding of the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept of the common good. Participation and diffusion explicate the constitutive properties of that concept rather than independently justify it against Maritain. Even if one grants that a common good must be the good of a whole to which parts are ordered, one may still ask why Maritain’s alternative conception should therefore be dismissed as a “sordid fraternity.” De Koninck suggests that, if the personalists were correct, the human person would have to find within herself both a sufficient object of love and a sufficient capacity to love in order to become her own end; only in advancing this proposition does he appear to move beyond conceptual analysis and toward an independent justification of his position. Since this justification rests on the claim that every created person is ordered to God, who alone can be loved as an end, it appears ultimately to be theological. It may nevertheless be worthwhile to assess this theological argument, advanced in support of an ethical thesis, in light of the current state of research in moral, social, and developmental psychology.
Finally, one last important point of divergence should be noted. Maritain maintains that the coincidence between the common good and the person’s proper good necessarily remains imperfect in this life, thereby preserving the need for rights. De Koninck holds that this coincidence can and indeed must be complete, since those who pursue the common good thereby pursue their own proper good ex consequenti. This is the thesis that the proper good of the person is integrally ordered to the common good—a thesis that, in De Koninck’s hands, appears to be unfalsifiable.
Conclusion
That the genuine philosophical debate I have just delineated translates, directly and of necessity, into a corresponding legal debate does not appear to be established. In other words, once transposed into the domain of law, the debate may ultimately amount to no more than a difference of emphasis. More precisely, I suspect that the necessary practical (legal and institutional) implications of both sides in this philosophical debate can only lead to the same destination—a sufficiently indeterminate endpoint to admit interpretive disagreements. It would therefore be illusory to regard those disagreements as determined by the philosophical debate I have sought to elucidate. Such skepticism stems from the fact that, in chapter IV of Man and the State, Maritain explains that even those natural rights he regards as “absolutely inalienable” may be subject to restrictions, at least with respect to their exercise, based on both the concrete possibilities of a given society and the common good. This, however, remains only a hypothesis, and the issue deserves further investigation.[1]
Reference:
[1] This post is drawn from a paper that constitutes the first part of a broader project. The next stage will further investigate the epistemological underpinnings of the Maritain–De Koninck controversy, including the significance that each philosopher attributed to scientific indeterminacy in quantum physics, as well as their respective conceptions of the relationship between religion, the state, and the law. Building on that philosophical analysis, the second part of the project will then examine the place of human rights and their interpretation in the thought of both Thomist thinkers.
