Akif Tahiiev is a post-doctoral research fellow at Goethe University Frankfurt.

In some countries, legal systems are deeply shaped by religious doctrines, especially in areas concerning personal status, such as marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. Under these frameworks, individuals belonging to different religious communities are often governed by distinct sets of laws. Although they may possess equal citizenship in theory, the legal rights, responsibilities, and protections afforded them in personal and familial matters can differ significantly depending on their religious affiliation.

For instance, Kuwait’s 1984 Personal Status Law provides separate legal frameworks for Sunni and Shiʿi Muslim citizens, reinforcing religious distinctions within the legal system. Under this law, in the context of marriage, a bride’s signature is not legally required in Sunni contracts but is mandatory in Shiʿi contracts to confirm her consent. Similarly, in Bahrain, according to Family Law No. 19 of 2017, a man can initiate a unilateral divorce without providing a specific reason, unless he has delegated this right to his wife—either through the marriage contract or a subsequent agreement. For Sunni men, if the divorce is declared outside of court, it can be validated based on evidence or the man’s acknowledgment. However, for Shiʿi divorces, the wife’s presence is required, and two witnesses must be present. Regardless of the sect, all divorce proceedings in Bahrain must be initiated before a judge, who is legally obligated to attempt reconciliation between the parties before proceeding.

These disparities extend into post-divorce matters as well, particularly in child custody arrangements, where the criteria and outcomes can vary significantly depending on the sectarian affiliation of the parents. Such legal differentiation underscores how religious identity can profoundly influence an individual’s rights and legal standing in personal and familial affairs. At the same time, this legal pluralism can lead to inconsistencies in the application of justice, raising critical questions about equality, secularism, and the protection of individual rights within a diverse society.

In certain instances, the state and its judicial institutions attempt to reconcile or mitigate the legal disparities arising from sectarian distinctions. For example, the already-mentioned Kuwait 1984 Personal Status Law stipulates that matters such as marital relations are generally governed by the religious legal school of the father or husband. However, judicial practice has demonstrated that exceptions to this principle can and do occur. In the realm of child custody, Sunni jurisprudence tends to prioritize the mother’s rights, particularly for young children up to a certain age—typically seven for boys and nine for girls—provided the mother meets moral and caregiving standards.

This preference is reflected in specific cases considered by Kuweitian courts. In case No. 139/98, where the mother was Sunni and the father Shiʿi, an unnamed court initially applied Shiʿi law, which prescribes an earlier termination of maternal custody. As a result, the father was awarded guardianship of the youngest child, while the two older children remained with their mother based on their own preference. However, on appeal, an appellate court reversed the decision and granted custody of all three children to the mother. The appellate court reasoned that, in such mixed-sect cases, legal interpretations should favor the mother’s custodial rights, particularly when they align with the children’s best interests. Furthermore, appellate rulings have at times prioritized maternal custody even when both parents belong to the Shiʿi community, suggesting a broader judicial tendency to interpret custody laws in ways that uphold the welfare of the child and the caregiving role of the mother, regardless of sectarian affiliation.

Conversely, some states utilize personal status law not to harmonize differences but to reinforce the marginalization of minority communities. In Saudi Arabia, Shiʿi Muslims experience systemic legal disadvantages, particularly due to the near absence of Jaʿfarī (Shiʿi) courts outside the Eastern Province, where most of the Shiʿi population is concentrated. While Shiʿi jurisprudence significantly diverges from the dominant Hanbali Sunni interpretation practiced by the state, Shiʿi citizens are frequently compelled to have their personal status matters—such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance—adjudicated in Sunni courts. This imposition not only disregards their religious legal traditions but also undermines their ability to exercise religious autonomy in deeply personal aspects of life. Even in regions where Jaʿfarī courts are permitted to operate, they often lack full judicial independence and institutional support, further entrenching perceptions of legal exclusion and disempowerment among Shiʿi communities.

When the state fails to address legal disparities—or worse, reinforces them—individuals are often left to navigate these inequalities on their own. In some cases, this leads people to strategically convert to another religion or denomination, not out of sincere theological conviction but as a means to access certain legal rights or to bypass restrictive rules imposed by their original religious framework. Such conversions can be motivated by practical concerns, such as gaining more favorable terms in divorce, custody disputes, inheritance claims, or marriage arrangements.

Below I explore three legal domains where strategic conversion is used to access a certain legal status or gain a stronger legal position in a potential legal dispute (i.e., involving marriage, divorce, or inheritance) and explain how states, and especially courts, respond to such legal strategies.

Conversions for Marriage

Lebanon offers one of the most compelling case studies for examining religious conversion driven by legal considerations, owing to its unique religious landscape. The Lebanese state officially recognizes 18 religious communities, each with its own autonomous courts governing matters of personal status.

The complexities are particularly evident in marriage laws. Under Islamic law, a Muslim man is permitted to marry a Christian or Jewish woman, but a Muslim woman cannot legally marry a non-Muslim man unless he converts to Islam. This restriction creates significant legal ambiguities. For instance, if a Christian man and a Muslim woman marry in a Christian ceremony, the marriage may not be recognized by Islamic courts. In the event of divorce, the Muslim woman may face legal disadvantages in Christian courts, where her rights may not be equal to those of a Christian wife.

Strategic conversion also occurs within Islam itself. Individuals have been known to convert from Shi‘ism to Sunnism—or vice versa—to gain familial or community approval for marriage. The situation is even more complex with the Druze community, since the Lebanese state includes the Druze among the five officially recognized Muslim communities, but many Sunni and Shiʿi religious authorities do not consider Druze to be Muslim. According to Druze personal status law, members are only allowed to marry within the Druze faith. A Druze individual seeking to marry outside the community cannot do so through Druze courts. If their partner is Sunni or Shiʿi and the couple turns to a sharia court, further complications may arise. As a result, a Sunni or Shiʿi judge may require the Druze partner—typically the woman—to convert to Islam for the marriage to be recognized.

Conversions for Divorce

Beyond marriage, conversion is also employed as a legal strategy to overcome other limitations embedded in personal status laws. For example, adherents of the Catholic Church in Lebanon, which prohibits divorce, sometimes convert to another Christian denomination or even another religion entirely to legally dissolve a marriage. A comparable dynamic can be observed in other countries too. In the Philippines, civil divorce is not available for Christians, but Muslims can divorce under Presidential Decree No. 1083, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. This has led some Filipinos to convert to Islam purely to access divorce.

In Egypt, Coptic Christian personal status law historically permitted divorce only under highly restrictive conditions, most notably in cases of adultery. This has led some Copts to convert to another Christian denomination or even Islam as a legal strategy to obtain a divorce that would otherwise be denied by the Coptic Church. While this route is not always successful—converts may face social stigma, familial estrangement, or even legal challenges regarding recognition of their conversion—it highlights the lengths to which individuals are willing to go to escape rigid religious constraints on personal matters.

However, recent legal developments in Egypt suggest a shift toward reform. The Personal Status Law for Christians, approved in December 2024, marked a significant departure from previous norms. Whereas divorce was once only permitted in cases of proven infidelity, the new legislation broadened the acceptable grounds for marital dissolution to include circumstances such as deception or dishonesty. This reform reflects an institutional effort to better address the lived realities of marital relationships within the Christian community. Importantly, it also demonstrates how legal systems can evolve to meet the needs of religious minorities, thereby reducing the pressure on individuals to seek conversion as a means of securing basic personal rights.

States’ Attempts to Police Religious Conversions

Some states have increasingly taken steps to scrutinize and restrict conversions for legal advantage. These measures aim to preserve the integrity of religious law and prevent its manipulation for purely strategic or legal ends. Two notable cases are the Philippines and India, where courts have actively intervened to assess the sincerity of religious conversions, especially when used to access rights not available under an individual’s original faith.

Philippine courts do not automatically accept conversions as valid for legal purposes. Instead, they often investigate whether the conversion was made in good faith or merely as a legal workaround. If the conversion is deemed insincere, both the conversion and any resulting divorce may be invalidated. Courts may examine whether the marriage was re-solemnized under Islamic rites, whether the spouses were genuinely accepted into the Muslim community, and whether procedural requirements under Presidential Decree No. 1083 were fulfilled. If these conditions are not met, the individual may face legal consequences, and the sharia divorce may be declared without legal effect. Such rulings underscore how the Philippine legal system seeks to balance respect for religious freedom with the prevention of legal exploitation.

A similar pattern is evident in India, where Hindu personal status law prohibits bigamy, while Islamic law permits polygyny. Some Hindu men have attempted to circumvent bigamy laws by converting to Islam and marrying a second wife. This practice was challenged in the landmark Supreme Court case Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India (1995), where the Court ruled that a Hindu marriage cannot be dissolved merely by conversion. The justices emphasized that the rights established under the Hindu Marriage Act—such as maintenance, inheritance, and the legal recognition of marriage—remain intact even if one spouse adopts another religion. The Court declared that a second marriage contracted by a Hindu man after converting to Islam, while his first marriage is still valid under Hindu law, constitutes bigamy and is punishable under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code. This precedent was reaffirmed in Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2000), where the Supreme Court upheld that freedom of religion does not include the right to use conversion as a tool to escape legal obligations.

These cases illustrate a broader legal trend: while religious freedom is claimed to be constitutionally protected in both countries, the state retains the authority to evaluate the authenticity of conversions when they intersect with personal status law. In doing so, courts aim to prevent the instrumentalization of religion and maintain the coherence and credibility of the legal system.

Posthumous Conversions

In some legal systems, the religious identity of a deceased individual continues to carry significant legal implications—particularly in matters of inheritance governed by personal status law. This has led to a curious and troubling phenomenon, where family members or heirs claim that a deceased relative belonged to a different religious sect to manipulate the division of the estate. Analyzing such cases of alleged conversions of Sunnis and Shiʿis in Pakistan, where sectarian affiliation directly influences inheritance shares, Ahmad Shahbaz Cheema has described these practices as “socially abhorrent but legally acceptable.” It should be noted that each Islamic legal tradition—such as Sunni and Shiʿi jurisprudence—offers distinct lists of heirs and corresponding shares. Consequently, the ability to classify a deceased person as a follower of one denomination over another can substantially change the distribution of the estate, sometimes entirely excluding certain heirs or significantly increasing the entitlement of others.

Pakistani courts have dealt with many cases of inheritance disputes. In Mst. Latifa Bibi v. Muhammad Bashir (2006), the deceased, Imam Bakhsh, died without issue, leaving behind a widow, a sister, and collateral relatives. The widow claimed the deceased was a Shiʿi Muslim, which, under Shiʿi law, favored her inheritance claim. The collaterals challenged this, arguing he was a Sunni, a classification that would entitle them to a residual share. While the familial and regional background of the deceased was predominantly Sunni, the court accepted the widow’s testimony that he practiced Shiʿi rituals and ruled accordingly, disqualifying the collaterals. A similar situation unfolded in Ahmad Khan v. Sikandar(1999), where the brother of a deceased man claimed the deceased was a Shiʿi in order to reduce the widow’s inheritance under Shiʿi law. The court, however, rejected this attempt, emphasizing that, unless proven otherwise, all Muslims in Pakistan are presumed to be Sunnis (as per Ghulam Shabbir v. Mst. Bakhat Khatoon (2009), for example). The burden of proof lay on the party asserting a sectarian affiliation different from the norm, and in this case, the brother failed to substantiate his claim. The widow thus retained her rightful share under Sunni inheritance law.

These cases expose a darker dimension of religious personal law—where sectarian identity becomes a tool for financial gain and even the dead are drawn into disputes over faith. Courts’ reliance on presumptive Sunni identity and testimonial evidence highlights both the procedural complexity and the moral ambiguity surrounding posthumous conversions. While the legal system may resolve such conflicts through evidentiary standards, the ethical discomfort remains: religious identity, even in death, becomes negotiable for material advantage.