Olga Breskaya is Associate Professor of Sociology of the Department of Philosophy, Sociology, Education and Applied Psychology at the University of Padua.
This post is part of a series on the sociology of religious freedom.
Together with theoretical perspectives on and analyses of religion’s judicialization worldwide, A Sociology of Religious Freedom devotes a key section to the empirical study of religious freedom and the methods developed to investigate it. As a coauthor, along with Giuseppe Giordan and James T. Richardson, my appreciation for this section was reinforced during a recent discussion of our book, when a panelist, a constitutional lawyer, made an insightful remark:
You sociologists talk about the measures and degrees of religious freedom. For us judges, who deal with legal cases in courts, there is only one scale—either there is freedom, or there isn’t.
In our book, the empirical sociology of religious freedom takes a somewhat inverse trajectory: rather than treating freedom as a fixed legal category, it focuses on how individuals construct a shared meaning of this freedom across its multiple dimensions. At the same time, it leaves room to address broader questions—such as whether religious freedom continues to function as a moral and political ideal that remains important for individuals.
This approach allows us to better understand a key controversy revealed in our findings: while some participants did not perceive religious freedom as personally important when responding to a direct statement (for example, “Religious freedom is important to me”), they nevertheless endorsed various aspects of it—such as the freedom to change one’s religion, the freedom to worship, or the principle of state non-interference in the activities of minority religions.
This raised a deeper question about how individuals perceive freedom, how their knowledge and everyday experiences shape that perception, and what influence the broader political and religious culture has on these understandings. The tension between perceptions of an abstract concept of religious freedom and its more specific aspects underscored the central methodological challenge of our research: developing an empirical instrument capable of translating the socio-legal framework on freedom of religion or belief into a set of comprehensive and methodologically robust measures that capture the multiple dimensions through which individuals experience and interpret this freedom in everyday life.
Empirical Sociology of Religious Freedom
In developing a model of empirical research, titled “Social Perceptions of Religious Freedom,” existing cross-national empirical studies on religious freedom were considered. To make sense of diverse methodologies, A Sociology of Religious Freedom presents a comprehensive overview of the key empirical projects devoted to this study over the past three decades. Particular attention is devoted to cross-national research conducted by the Association of Religion Data Archives, directed by Roger Finke; Pew Research Forum; Religion and State Project, directed by Jonathan Fox; and Religion and Human Rights Project, coordinated by Johannes van der Ven and Hans-Georg Ziebertz. The findings from this latter project were published in the Springer book series Religions and Human Rights.
Although research has largely focused on governmental and societal forms of religious discrimination, few studies have conducted individual-level analyses that explore how people themselves understand freedom of and from religion. How do individuals define these concepts, given the broad scope of religious freedom entitlements? To what extent do perceptions of freedom of religion or belief depend on religious affiliation—whether one is an adherent of a dominant religious tradition, a member of a minority faith, or identifies as religiously unaffiliated (“none”)? Furthermore, do factors such as religious socialization within the family, awareness of common misconceptions about religious freedom, personal experiences of spirituality or religiosity, and political views and preferences serve as correlates shaping individuals’ levels of commitment to or resistance toward religious freedom?
In our book, we offer a definition of religious freedom that encompasses five dimensions of this concept: (1) individual autonomy, (2) societal value, (3) normative principle of state-religion governance, (4) international human rights standards, and (5) impact of judicialization of religion. We subsequently operationalize this multidimensional definition to guide an empirical study of social perceptions of religious freedom.
Social Perceptions of Religious Freedom and Their Correlates
To capture the multifaceted nature of religious freedom, we developed a questionnaire exploring its various dimensions and social contexts. The instrument was tested on a sample of university students and comprised 60 items addressing religious freedom, alongside sections on attitudes toward religion, human rights, broader societal perspectives, and participants’ sociodemographic characteristics. This comprehensive design allowed for a nuanced interpretation of how young people perceive religious freedom.
The first study of Social Perceptions of Religious Freedom, conducted at the University of Padova in 2018 on an Italian convenience sample, tested the developed instrument. The results suggested that participants primarily associated the meaning of religious freedom with its societal value—specifically, its role in promoting interreligious dialogue, cultural and religious diversity, tolerant and peaceful coexistence among religions, and democratic citizenship.
The developed Index of Social Perceptions of Religious Freedom (SPRF Index) indicated that, among the dimensions examined, the scale of “societal value” (M = 4.06) received the highest support,[1] followed by the “individual autonomy” scale (M = 3.87) indicating the importance of pursuit of one’s personal spiritual fulfilment, quest for individual truth, and centrality of the idea of human dignity. The scale of “impact of judicialization of religious freedom” (M = 3.57) and the scale of “international human rights standard” (M = 3.54) were rated moderately.
Moreover, the data suggested that agreement with the general statement “Religious freedom is important for me” is of particular importance for young Italians, regardless of their religious or nonreligious identities. Specifically, 85% of religious nones (those not affiliated with any religious tradition), 89% of Catholics, and 91% of participants belonging to religious minorities endorsed the importance of religious freedom for them.
The predictors of perceptions of religious freedom encompass a broad spectrum of spiritual, political, and civic dimensions and the specific role religion performs in public and private spheres. They include individuals’ spirituality, the peacebuilding functions of religion, the active public role of religion, and religion’s support for belief and collective experiences. Other predictors highlight the role of religion in providing meaning for individual life and social order, as well as participants’ positive attitudes toward religious diversity. Civic and political factors also play a role, including respect for civil-political rights (e.g., freedom of expression), recognition of intersecting rights with religious freedom, and general awareness of religious freedom principles. Additional predictors involve a diversity-oriented model of equal citizenship, the negative impact of state control over religion, and the importance of democracy. Together, these predictors provide a comprehensive framework for understanding the complex factors that shape individuals’ respect for and perceptions of religious freedom.
Overall, endorsement of the SPRF Index is primarily predicted by alignment with a political secularist orientation, positive attitudes toward other human rights, political engagement, social inclusion, and the importance of democracy, rather than by religious affiliation or practice. However, endorsement of religious freedom is sensitive to spiritual identities among young Italians. This may be due to the context of Italian Catholic culture, individual practices of spirituality, and the evolving patterns of spirituality among religious nones.
Examining perceptions of individual dimensions of religious freedom, we found that they are sensitive to the continuum of state-religion identification. For instance, both state endorsement of Catholicism and state control of religion negatively influence the perceived societal value of religious freedom in the Italian sample.
The Importance of a Cross-National Perspective in Empirical Research on Religious Freedom
The data of Social Perceptions of Religious Freedom become more informative if compared between national contexts. For example, comparing Italian and Russian youth in their perceptions of religious freedom, in assessments conducted in 2018 and 2019, suggest two main findings for us.
First, Italian participants endorsed the socio-legal and human rights aspects of religious freedom more strongly, whereas Russian participants placed greater emphasis on the dimension of individual autonomy. The conceptual dimensions most closely associated with the social normativity of religious freedom—representing a form of social knowledge and “normative reality”—received less support from Russian youth compared with their Italian counterparts.
Second, religious pluralism emerged as a strong predictor of perceptions of religious freedom, influencing socio-legal, human rights, and individual autonomy dimensions in both the Italian and Russian samples. This finding is particularly striking given that twice as many Italian youth endorsed the statement “Having many different religious points of view is good for society in my country” compared with Russian participants (81% versus 41%). Similarly, agreement with the statement “Having people from different religions in my country is enriching” was higher among Italian youth than among their Russian counterparts (85% versus 60%).
Moreover, passive secularism was positively associated with nearly all aspects of religious freedom, except for individual autonomy in the Russian sample. Finally, pro-democratic views showed a robust positive effect on most dimensions of religious freedom, stronger for Italian youth than Russian youth, particularly regarding individual autonomy.
The robust predictive effects of religious pluralism, passive secularism, and the importance of democracy—observed across societies with contrasting political cultures and varying levels of governmental and societal regulation of religious freedom—underscore the central role of normative concepts in the social implementation of religious freedom and in fostering a culture of religious freedom within societies.
These comparative results suggest that lower levels of incorporation of religious freedom principles into the social fabric may generate greater demand among citizens for religious freedom as a form of individual autonomy. This observation can be interpreted as a refinement of the religious economy model, which posits that increased government interference in the religious sphere diminishes the vibrancy and competitiveness of the religious market, thereby reducing the availability of religious goods—such as practices, connections, and experiences—for individuals.
From the perspective of a sociology of religious freedom, this empirical study provides data supporting our argument regarding the multidimensional nature of religious freedom and the significance of structural conditions—such as religious pluralism, political secularism, and the judicialization of religious freedom—which must be considered alongside individuals’ subjective demands for free spiritual development. The limitations of the proposed model for the study of social perceptions of religious freedom highlight the need for further work on the sociological conceptualization of religious freedom and for the conducting of representative studies in the future.
Reference:
[1] Respondents were asked to assess how much they agree with the following statements, using a five-point Likert-type scale (1 = disagree strongly, 2 = disagree, 3 = not certain, 4 = agree, 5 = agree strongly).