Can we Protect Privacy Without Erasing History? The Question at the Heart of Bisdom Gent Case

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Montserrat Gas-Aixendri is Full Professor of Law at Universitat Internacional de Catalunya School of Law in Barcelona.

On 1 October 2026, Advocate General Laila Medina delivered her opinion in Bisdom Gent (C-12/25), offering legal guidance to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ahead of its ruling. The dispute arose when a person baptized in the Catholic Church requested the removal of his entry from the baptismal register. Rather than erasing it, the diocese recorded the person’s decision to leave the Church while preserving the original entry. Following proceedings before the Belgian Data Protection Authority, the case was referred to the CJEU. It raises questions about privacy, freedom of conscience, and the autonomy of religious communities. Yet behind these complex legal issues lies a deceptively simple question: what exactly is a baptismal register?

The Advocate General’s opinion merits close attention. She acknowledges that the Church may have compelling grounds to retain information for sacramental purposes. She also rightly distinguishes the regulation of personal data from the theological meaning of baptism. My concern, however, is that the opinion gives insufficient weight to what baptismal registers actually do. That initial misunderstanding risks distorting the assessment of whether identifying records are necessary and what remedy is appropriate.

I am not arguing that baptismal records fall outside the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). They contain structured personal data and may qualify as a filing system under EU law. But GDPR Article 5(1)(b) and (c) requires that personal data be processed for specific purposes and limited to what is necessary to achieve those purposes. Defining something as a filing system tells us which law applies; it does not tell us why the information is kept. This distinction is especially important for sensitive data revealing religion. GDPR Article 9(2)(d) expressly permits certain not-for-profit bodies with religious aims to process such data about members and former members, subject to safeguards and limits on disclosure. Other GDPR requirements still apply. The application of these provisions to baptismal records must nevertheless take account of their specific documentary and sacramental functions.

A Record of a Sacrament, Not a Membership List

A baptismal register is not a list of members of the Catholic Church. It records the administration of a sacrament and facts with continuing legal significance within the Church. The Code of Canon Law describes baptism as the gateway to the other sacraments (canon 849) and states that it cannot be repeated (canon 845 §1). Canon 877 §1, requires the recording of names of the baptized person, minister, parents, and sponsors, along with dates and places. Canon 535 §2, calls for later entries concerning confirmation, marriage, sacred orders, and perpetual religious profession.

These rules describe more than a religious belief. They explain why the register serves as legal evidence: it may establish whether the requirements for another sacrament are met or whether a relevant event has already taken place. Its purposedoes not disappear because the person no longer believes or wishes to identify with the Church, as discussed in an earlier comparative study.

The French Conseil d’État gave weight to this purpose in its decision of 2 February 2024 (no. 461093). It considered the register’s sacramental function, possible future use, and restricted access, as well as the option of recording a person’s rejection of Catholic affiliation. In that case, the Conseil d’État found compelling legitimate grounds for retaining the entry. That French judgment resolves the dispute before the national court; it is not binding on the CJEU when it interprets EU law. Nevertheless, its reasoning shows why the record’s purpose matters.

The Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the European Union (COMECE) published a position paper on 2 September 2026 that adds an important distinction. Notes recording a person’s wish to dissociate were introduced partly in response to civil data-protection concerns. They do not turn baptismal books into membership lists. A measure adopted to protect individual rights should not be mistaken for evidence of the register’s original purpose.

How an Inaccurate Premise Changes the Necessity Test

The Advocate General accepts (para. 115) that administering the sacraments may provide compelling legitimate grounds under GDPR Article 21(1). Yet she questions the need to preserve an identifiable entry by pointing to possible alternatives: A person returning to the Church might produce correspondence about an earlier erasure request. In cases of doubt, conditional baptism may be possible under canon 869.

Neither example makes a reliable register unnecessary. Exceptional ways of proving an event do not replace the ordinary value of an official record. Conditional baptism addresses uncertainty; it is not a routine substitute for documentation designed to prevent it. And baptismal records serve more purposes than establishing whether someone has already been baptized. They link that event to subsequent acts within the Church’s legal order.

The real question is whether identifying the person remains necessary for the register’s legitimate documentary and canonical functions, given the safeguards governing access and use. It is not enough to show that a hypothetical problem might somehow be solved without the original entry. Legal systems routinely maintain authoritative records even where alternative evidence may occasionally exist.

The above-mentioned arguments do not justify keeping all information indefinitely or using it for unrelated purposes. Still, they mean that necessity must be tested against the register’s actual function. An elaborate balancing exercise will be forever flawed if its starting point is wrong.

The Interests Are Not Exclusively Bilateral

The Advocate General’s opinion also tends to frame the dispute as one between the individual seeking erasure and the diocese holding the data. But a baptismal entry records an event involving others. Canon 877 refers to parents, sponsors, the minister, and sometimes witnesses. Later entries may matter to spouses and others whose legal position depends on reliable canonical records.

COMECE’s position paper highlights these third-party interests and the occasional value of Church records in civil proceedings. Particular claims must be assessed carefully; a possible benefit to someone else does not automatically override privacy rights. Even so, the record can protect more than the diocese’s administrative convenience.

The Irish Data Protection Commission’s decision of 27 February 2023 concerning the Archbishop of Dublin is revealing. It examined the legal basis for retaining baptismal data, the function of the register, and safeguards for those who no longer identify as Catholic. The decision shows that protecting former believers and retaining a trustworthy institutional record need not be mutually exclusive. The regulator accepted legitimate interests as a basis for the processing and considered GDPR Article 9(2)(d) relevant to special-category data. It also considered a statement recording a person’s rejection of Catholic identification.

The GDPR does not establish an unconditional right to erasure. In particular, Article 21(1) allows a controller to continue processing personal data despite an objection where “compelling legitimate grounds” override the individual’s interests and rights. In the case of baptismal registers, determining whether such grounds exist requires a proper understanding of their documentary, legal, and sacramental functions, as well as the consequences of erasing identifying information.

Erasure that Leaves a Register Unable to Function

The difficulty becomes clearest when the remedy is considered. The Advocate General suggests that, if the diocese cannot establish overriding compelling grounds after an individual assessment, a marginal note will not suffice. Identifying information would then have to be made illegible, potentially by physical means (para. 209). This is a conditional proposal, not a requirement to erase every baptismal entry. Even so, erasure may leave the register physically intact while depriving the affected entry of its evidentiary value. This would undermine the register’s essential function as an authoritative record of events with continuing legal and sacramental significance.

The Advocate General is right that EU law may regulate data without deciding whether baptism still exists in Catholic theology. But a measure that leaves doctrine untouched can still impair the Church’s ability to act on it. What matters is not only what erasure means in theory, but what it does in practice.

There is a vital qualification. Under GDPR Articles 21(1) and 17(1)(c), erasure follows where an objection succeeds and the controller cannot show overriding compelling legitimate grounds. A court cannot simply substitute a milder remedy because it seems preferable. The decisive question arises in the earlier, fundamental inquiry: have the grounds been assessed in light of the record’s real function and the consequences of disabling it?

Different Operations Require Different Safeguards

Keeping a record is not the same as using or disclosing it. GDPR Article 4(2) treats storage, consultation, use, and disclosure as distinct forms of processing. Their effects differ. Preserving a confidential entry is not the same as presenting someone publicly as a practicing Catholic or using the information for unwanted contact.

That difference matters for safeguards. A person’s rejection of Catholic identity can be recorded without rewriting the past. Access can be limited to authorized persons and genuine canonical needs, while unnecessary consultation and external disclosure can be prevented. GDPR rules on confidentiality, data protection by design, and security (Articles 5(1)(f), 25, and 32) apply fully. These practical protections deserve individual scrutiny. A strictly confidential record presents a different risk from a searchable database used to contact people or publish religious affiliations. Restrictions must be genuine and enforceable.

The French Conseil d’État considered restricted access and marginal annotation when assessing retention; the Irish regulator also looked closely at safeguards. Neither approach creates an automatic exemption for Church records nor proves that a note will always suffice. Both show why retention should not be confused with unrestricted use.

For the individual, the essential protections are freedom to leave a religion, freedom from misleading claims of present membership, and protection against misuse of sensitive data. For the Church, the legitimate interest is maintaining an authentic record. The task is to see how far these aims can coexist.

Religious Autonomy Must Have Practical Meaning

The debate also involves the EU Charter’s Article 10 and the TFEU’s Article 17(1), the latter of which requires the Union to respect the status of churches under national law. These provisions do not exempt religious bodies from the GDPR or from judicial review of their compliance with EU law; nevertheless, such scrutiny must take religious autonomy seriously.

No one need endorse Catholic teaching to understand that the Church’s records carry legal and sacramental functions. Acknowledging those functions is not giving the Church the final say; it is identifying what must be weighed. The individual’s freedom to leave must be taken equally seriously. Unwanted identification with a religion can cause genuine distress. The question is whether the particular way the information is retained or used produces that harm and whether addressing it requires the loss of the register’s separate evidentiary function.

Start by Understanding the Register

Bisdom Gent is not simply a contest between privacy and church autonomy. It tests whether legal balancing begins with an accurate description of the record at issue. The Advocate General rightly refuses to give automatic priority to either side. Yet treating the baptismal register primarily as information about an individual risks overlooking its role as authoritative evidence in a religious legal system.

A sound approach would recognize the GDPR’s application, identify the record’s purpose, consider all affected interests, and distinguish secure retention from harmful use or disclosure. The justification for retaining identifiable data should then be assessed against realistic safeguards and the concrete consequences of erasure.

Privacy deserves effective protection, and leaving a faith must have real consequences for how personal information is used. But where confidential retention serves a genuine documentary purpose, its necessity should be assessed on that basis rather than through assumptions drawn from membership databases. Protecting privacy need not mean erasing history: it requires understanding what the record proves, while ensuring it is never used to imply present religious allegiance.

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