Ihntaek Hwang is an affiliated researcher at the Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI) in Finland.
Since 1951, South Korea has conscripted all physically eligible males over the age of 18. For more than half a century, the South Korean state imprisoned conscientious objectors in large numbers lest they “jeopardize the military and, hence, the vital common interest of national security upon which the constitutional rights and freedoms of individuals stand.”[1] As of 2017, around 19,000 South Korean men had been imprisoned for refusing military service, most of whom received a sentence of 18 months. South Korean conscientious objectors even accounted for more than 90% of those imprisoned worldwide for conscientious objection.
South Koreans long considered conscientious objection an issue for Jehovah’s Witnesses only. However, since the early 2000s, with the heightened awareness of human rights and the launching of the anti-war NGO “World Without War,” objectors who are not Jehovah’s Witnesses (e.g., pacifists and anti-militarists) have begun to draw public attention. Despite persecution, through public announcements in the courtrooms and on the streets of their intention to refuse conscription, conscientious objectors have consistently voiced their disagreement with the widely held belief that the military ensures security. The objectors’ convictions expand beyond pacifism and anti-militarism; objectors also base their objections on concerns about the environment, sexual rights, anarchism, patriarchal masculinity, personal histories, and many more grounds.
On 28 June 2018, the Constitutional Court ruled that the Military Service Act, which does not offer alternative service, is unconstitutional, as it violates freedom of conscience protected by Article 19 of the South Korean Constitution. After heated debates involving the National Assembly, the South Korean government, and the public over the duration and place of a new alternative service, on 26 October 2020, the government implemented one form of alternative service that does not involve carrying arms. The duration of this alternative service is 36 months, much longer than the duration of active-duty service, currently 18–21 months. In addition, alternative service requires the drafted to work and lodge in correctional facilities such as prisons. Currently, no other options are available. Those who apply for alternative service must undergo a screening process by the Alternative Service Commission (hereafter Commission), an arm of the Military Manpower Administration. Although the introduction of alternative service constitutes progress from the wholesale imprisonment of conscientious objectors in the past, many civil society activists have criticized the service as designed and implemented, saying it still fails to protect minority conscience.
In implementing alternative service, the Commission has screened “genuine acts of conscience” from draft evasions. For the screening process, the Commission has required applicants to submit statements from three close acquaintances (e.g., family, friends, teachers, or coworkers). This requirement has caused problems, especially for applicants whose close acquaintances do not support their decision to apply for alternative service. Applicants are potentially subjected to pressure to comport with conscription by the very figures who can vouch for the applicant.
Moreover, applicants must submit copies of detailed records from their junior high school and high school, including their teachers’ observations of their personalities and development. Applicants must also submit a personal statement that describes how they have come to possess their conscience through their cumulative life experiences. These demands assume that successful applicants have maintained “the right kind of conscience” and acted accordingly throughout their adolescence and early twenties. However, forming one’s conscience is usually not as linear and coherent as the Commission presupposes. Some applicants have expressed frustrations that the screening process forced them to frame and limit the narrative of their conscience to “pass” the Commission’s investigation (World Without War 2021). The resulting effect of the screening process is that alternative service is entered through a grant of discretionary permission by the state instead of through the exercise of a citizen’s right. Those who refuse or fail to enter alternative service may be imprisoned, a punishment that continues to be imposed in 2024.
In addition, the duration of alternative service, 36 months, is considered discriminatory and punitive. Alternative service is incompatible with international human rights standards as it is much longer than active-duty service without reasonable justification. The key reason for setting the alternative service period at 36 months is to address the potential unfairness felt by active-duty personnel. The primary concern when introducing alternative service was that it would demoralize active-duty soldiers and potential conscripts would choose alternative service over military service. Also, according to the Constitutional Court, gaining public support for alternative service depends on ensuring fairness in sharing the burden of conscription between active duty and alternative service.[2] However, the notion of fairness is arbitrary and cannot serve as a reasonable or valid justification for the duration of alternative service.
Alternatively, public concern for fairness could have been directed to exploring ways to improve the rights of both active-duty and alternative-service personnel. Instead, the South Korean government focused mainly on making alternative service seem unattractive to future conscripts through the significantly longer service period. As a result, South Korean society and government continue to perpetuate the highly gendered myth that military service is a rite of passage during which men must endure uncomfortable treatment to qualify as (allegedly) equal fellow citizens.
Also considered discriminatory and punitive is the fact that the only alternative service option is working and (barrack-style) lodging in correctional facilities. In this regard, alternative service has failed to remove the stigma associated with conscientious objectors. Moreover, restricting alternative service to correctional facilities militarizes alternative service. Because correctional facilities are key military targets during war, they frequently conduct military training. Although objectors do not participate in such military training, they are exposed to a militarizing environment throughout their service. In such facilities, external scrutiny and internal criticism are usually limited for security purposes, while orders are unilaterally issued top-down. Notably, correctional facilities tend to be closed and male-dominated spaces; alternative service personnel have complained that human rights assessments and satisfaction surveys are conducted only in a formal manner.
In addition, although the screening process solicits and considers conscientious objectors’ diverse convictions, correctional facilities administrations are indifferent to objectors’ convictions. Instead, personnel are pressured to perform tasks diligently and quickly adapt to the order of the correctional facility. As a result, alternative service has neglected its potential to improve public sectors experiencing personnel shortages, such as education, hospitality, caregiving, community service, and the like.
Although the core goal of introducing alternative service was to harmonize the duty to national defense and freedom of conscience, the extent to which this goal has been realized since 2020 remains questionable. Yong-Suk Lee, a conscientious objector and activist at World Without War, states that alternative service is not only a human rights issue but also a matter of collectively envisioning what kind of peace South Korean society should pursue and how. Notably, traditional military security measures cannot address unpredictable future threats like pandemics, climate change, economic crises, and others. If alternative service could genuinely respect various minority consciences, it could be a means for reimagining peace, security, and survival in less militarizing ways and in ways that maximize human potential in South Korea.
References:
[1] See Constitutional Court of Korea [Const. Ct.], The Constitutional Appeal Against the Military Service Law Article 88 Section 1 Clause 1, 2002Hun-Ka1, 26 August 2004 (S. Kor.); Constitutional Court of Korea [Const. Ct.], The Constitutional Appeal Against the Military Service Law Article 88 Section 1 Clause 1, 2008Hun-Ka22, 30 August 2011 (S. Kor.) [in Korean].
[2] Constitutional Court of Korea [Const. Ct.], Case on Alternative Military Service, 2021Hun-Ma117, 30 May 2024 [in Korean].
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