
Ori Aronson is a professor of law and the director of the Menomadin Center for Jewish and Democratic Law at the Bar-Ilan University Faculty of Law.
On 30 March 2026, in the midst of Israel’s latest war with Iran, the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, passed the “Death Penalty for Terrorists Law.” The new Law imposes the death penalty on terrorists tried in either Israeli civilian courts or military courts in the West Bank, and it stipulates new rules as to the carrying out of a sentence of execution. The Law breaks with Israel’s longstanding rejection, both de jure and de facto, of the death penalty, an exceptional punishment used only once ever in the state’s history, against a Nazi criminal. The Law signifies the ascent of nationalist and populist politics in Israel in the aftermath of the 7 October 2023 attacks and the traumatic hostage crisis that ensued. It is a troubling retrenchment from Israel’s commitment to Jewish and democratic values and is likely to invoke a contested constitutional debate as its validity now goes before the Supreme Court.
The Law: An Overview
In the context of civilian criminal proceedings, the Law directs courts in Israel to impose either the death penalty or life imprisonment on terrorists who “intentionally caused the death of a person with the aim of denying the existence of the State of Israel.” In the context of proceedings in Israeli military courts, which operate in the West Bank as part of the belligerent occupation regime there, the Law provides the death penalty will be imposed on Palestinians who “intentionally caused the death of a person” as part of an “act of terror,” with an alternative punishment of life imprisonment allowed only in exceptional circumstances. In addition, the Law provides, inter alia, that a decision to impose the death penalty shall not be contingent on prosecutorial request or support; that a final death sentence shall be carried out within 90 days, by hanging at the hands of a prison warden; and that the identities of those involved in the execution process shall remain confidential.

Although the death penalty is not completely foreign to Israel’s laws, it has been effectively abandoned as a legitimate punishment since the Country’s founding in 1948. By 1954, the Knesset had already abolished the death penalty for murder, leaving it on the books only for the gravest of crimes but practically never resorting to its operation. The sole judicially sanctioned execution to ever take place in Israel was that of the Nazi criminal Adolf Eichmann in 1962, its exceptional nature tying capital punishment to the unique context of the Holocaust and reflecting its overall rejection in any other context.
Political Background
Proposals to reintroduce the death penalty into Israeli law and to apply it specifically to terrorists have been aired in Israel for many years but were usually taken as mere political bluster. The Law’s passage at this time therefore reflects a shift in Israeli political culture. It was driven by the 2022 rise to power of an ultra-nationalist coalition government and was legitimized in the aftermath of the October 7 attacks, experienced by many Israelis as tantamount to Nazi crimes. (Note that the new Law does not apply retroactively and therefore would not apply to the perpetrators of those attacks. A separate statute, just enacted by the Knesset, provides for their adjudication in a special military tribunal authorized to try defendants under existing laws that allow—though were never used—for the imposition of the death penalty, e.g., laws against the crime of genocide, violation of national sovereignty, and acts of war.)
The extended hostage crisis—in which 251 Israeli civilians were abducted during the October 7 attack and held in Gaza for long months under brutal conditions, with 85 murdered or dead in captivity—reinforced the perception that holding terrorists as prisoners incentivizes abductions and leads to the early release of terrorists in exchange deals. The government’s nationalistic members exploited these sentiments, portraying the death penalty as the only viable response to Palestinian terrorism. Some of them began proudly wearing a yellow pin with the image of a noose, chillingly echoing the ubiquitous yellow ribbon pin worn by millions of Israelis as an act of solidarity with the hostages held in Gaza.

The Law should also be understood in the broader context of the so-called “judicial reform” led by the Israeli government since January 2023. The Law is another measure curbing judicial discretion and exploiting the judicial process for political gain as part of a polarizing political campaign. Indeed, even if the Law or some of its provisions would be struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional, this will likely serve the campaign to portray the Court as an elitist institution, detached from the people’s genuine wish for justice, retribution, and revenge.
Legal Assessment
The new Law thus reinstates the death penalty for the offense of murder in specified circumstances, 72 years after it was abolished; establishes a nearly mandatory death penalty (save in exceptional circumstances) in military courts in the West Bank, where most terrorist suspects are tried; restricts the death penalty either to perpetrators acting out of ideological opposition to Israel (in civilian courts), or (in the West Bank) to Palestinian defendants alone; and includes a series of draconian rules and procedures for its imposition and execution.
Several constitutional petitions have already been filed with the Supreme Court asking it to review and strike down the Law. Under Israel’s Basic Laws, the death penalty Law is likely to be found in violation of several protected constitutional rights, including the rights to life, human dignity, and nondiscrimination. For the Law to survive review, its rights violations must be shown to be proportionate to the public interests the Law purports to serve. This is a tall order: The Law seems exceptionally problematic under Israeli constitutional law given the lack of accepted empirical evidence to support the claim that the death penalty would in fact deter acts of terrorism (augmented by the security establishment’s vacillation on the matter during Knesset hearings); the irreversible nature of the death penalty (precluding the possibility of error correction); and the uniquely draconian characteristics of the Israeli legislation (namely: its use of the death penalty as a default sentence, its facial discrimination among those subject to the punishment, and the limitations it imposes on judicial and prosecutorial discretion). The Law also raises concerns as to Israel’s compliance with its obligations under international law, in terms of both human rights protections and the validity of Knesset legislation applied to the West Bank.
Above all, however, the reintroduction of the death penalty goes against Israel’s own longstanding identity as a “Jewish and democratic state.” This fundamental combination is generally understood to call for seeking the common ground between liberal values and those of Jewish tradition as the basis for legitimate state action. The sanctity of human life is perhaps the quintessential value shared by both value systems—a realization not missed by the Knesset legislators from all parties who came together to reject the death penalty upon the state’s establishment and took pride in its reflection of age-old Jewish precepts as well as modern liberal sensibilities. If the Law is in fact enforced against future perpetrators, or even merely legitimizes the use of the death penalty under other laws that have lain dormant for generations, Israel will enter a new and troubling phase in its moral development.
